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This paper tests two explanations for apparent undersaving in life cycle mod-
els: bounded rationality and a preference for immediacy. Each was addressed in a
separate experimental study. In the first study, subjects saved too little initially—
providing evidence for bounded rationality—but learned to save optimally within
four repeated life cycles. In the second study, thirsty subjects who consume bever-
age sips immediately, rather than with a delay, show greater relative overspending,
consistent with quasi-hyperbolic discounting models. The parameter estimates of
overspending obtained from the second study, but not the first, are in range of
several empirical studies of saving (with an estimated /1 = 0.6-0.7).
I. INTRODUCTION
Field evidence on whether people save optimally is mixed.'
Some recent studies suggest saving is optimal; 2 other recent
research argues that consumers make fundamental mistakes
regarding saving3 and typically undersave4 relative to optimal
levels. One reason for mixed results is that econometric tests
must make several auxiliary assumptions about the underlying
model. 5 Laboratory experiments may be of some use in this area
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1. The earliest sophisticated analyses assume certain (or certainty-
equivalent) income in order to solve the models, and reject many of the predictions
of life cycle theory. With the advent of better computing power and relaxation of
restriction on the income process, Zeldes (1989) and Carroll (1992, 1997) are able
to explain many aspects of consumption found in data using Friedman's (1957)
original ideas.
2. See Lusardi, Skinner, and Venti (2001); Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun
(2006); Darlin (2007); or Scholz and Seshadri (2007).
3. See Choi et al. (2003); Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2005); Haveman et al.
(2006), or Benartzi and Thaler (2007).
4. Though, see Rick, Cryder, and Loewenstein (2008).
5. It is difficult to conclusively reject or accept the basic premise of life cycle
saving, which is that current saving correctly anticipates future needs and income
variation, and smoothes consumption (Browning and Lusardi 1996; Venti 2006).
The difficulty stems from the fact that econometric tests of the life cycle model typ-
ically depend on many auxiliary assumptions about utility functions, separability
across time, income expectations, retirement and other institutional rules, sorting,
2009 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
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of research because the maintained assumptions of a particular
theory (e.g., about utility functions and beliefs about the income
process) can be clearly implemented with experimental control.
This paper explores how well people make dynamic optimiza-
tion decisions in a complex experimental environment. The es-
sential design parameters were taken from models of consumer
saving with income uncertainty and habit formation, which cre-
ated a two-state finite dynamic program. To follow the optimal
saving path, subjects must consume very little in early periods to
buffer against bad income shocks and to avoid creating an early
consumption "internality" from habit that reduces utility from
future consumption.
This paper tests two classes of explanations for apparent ev-
idence of undersaving: bounded rationality and a preference for
immediacy (or present-bias). Each was addressed in a separate ex-
perimental study. Reporting the two studies together enables di-
rect judgment of which explanation is generally better (or whether
both have some merit) and allows some parametric comparison
with field data.
In the first study, subjects had an opportunity to learn pri-
vately over seven experimental life cycles or to learn "socially"
from the choices of other subjects. If learning creates movement
toward optimal choice, that is prima facie evidence of bounded ra-
tionality in initial choices (because highly rational subjects would
not need to learn). The goal in this study was to see how close
subjects were to optimal, how well they learned, and whether de-
viations from optimality resemble those in field data (as calibrated
by ,B and S parameters in quasi-hyperbolic models). The results
of the first study were that subjects undersaved at first but were
able to learn very quickly from social information and less quickly
from private learning.
and credit market constraints. Apparent statistical evidence of undersaving in any
particular study might be due to one or more econometric misspecifications or to
mismeasurement of capital gains, educational returns, or durable consumption
flows (Gale, Sabelhaus, and Hall 1999). For example, using the economic surprise
of German reunification, Fuchs-Schundeln and Schundeln (2005) find that evi-
dence of buffer-stock savings is sensitive to self-selection of risk-averse workers
into low-risk professions. Skinner (2007) studies how much savings is needed for
a comfortable retirement and shows how difficult it is to answer that question.
6. Dynamic optimization of sequential choices is central to many different
economic analyses. In the most interesting cases, current choices affect state
variables, which either constrain future choices or influence future utility. De-
cisions of this type include extensive-form games with type updating, job search,
fertility timing, purchases of durables and equipment replacement, investment
with learning-by-doing, and many diet and health choices (including addictive
consumption).
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LEARNING AND TEMPTATION IN SAVING EXPERIMENTS 199
The approximation to optimality observed after learning was
surprisingly close. This near-optimality after learning turned our
attention to the second basic explanation for undersaving, a pref-
erence for immediacy. Even if people fully understand optimal
saving rules, optimal saving might be hard to implement if the
choices that generate current utility are viscerally tempting (as
in the most extreme case, of addictions).
Therefore, the second study used thirsty subjects who chose
how much beverage to consume, as an experimental-scale model
of more dramatic types of visceral temptation. Some subjects re-
ceived beverages immediately (i.e., their period t decisions led to
physical consumption in period t) and others received beverages
with a ten-period delay (as if ordering from a catalog for later de-
livery). This immediate-delayed contrast is a simple way to detect
the preference for immediacy (because the f3 term only influenced
decisions when consumption was immediate).
In this second experiment, subjects generally consumed more
when rewards were immediate than when rewards were delayed,
a difference that is consistent with models of hyperbolic discount-
ing (i.e., Ainslie [1975]; Laibson [1997]) and dual-self conflict
(e.g., Bernheim and Rangel [2004]; Loewenstein and O'Donoghue
[2004]; Fudenberg and Levine [20061). Structural parameter esti-
mates of / and B yielded values comparable to those in other lab
and field studies (mean f3 of 0.6-0.7), albeit over very different
time horizons.
11. Two EXPLANATIONS FOR UNDERSAVING
The experimental design implemented the assumptions of the
buffer stock savings model of Carroll, Overland, and Weil (2000).
Agents earned income each period, subject to stochastic indepen-
dent shocks from a distribution they knew. In each period their
available cash was the previous period's savings (buffer stock),
plus new income. In each period they chose how much of this
available cash to spend on consumption and the rest was saved.
Utility in each period depended upon a ratio of current consump-
tion to a habit index. The habit index was a depreciated sum
of previous consumption (as in the pioneering design of Fehr and
Zych [1998] based on Becker and Murphy [1988]). An entire thirty-
period life cycle was repeated several times with different income
realizations each time. Two alternative explanations, which have
been hypothesized to explain consumer undersaving in the field,
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suggested why subjects might have saved too little in this experi-
mental environment.
H.A. Bounded Rationality
One explanation for apparent undersaving is the bounded
rationality of consumers; 7 They may undersave because their ra-
tionality is bounded, and solving for optimal saving in the buffer
stock model is computationally difficult.' Carroll puts it bluntly:
One problem is the spectacular contrast between the sophisticated mathe-
matical apparatus required to solve the optimal consumption problem and
the mathematical imbecility of most consumers. (2001, 41)
After all, economists were unable to solve the general form of
the same problem posed in our experiment themselves, before
later advances in computing. (Instead, they used an approxima-
tion with certainty-equivalent income for many years.) The results
of saving experiments agree: most find evidence of undersaving
and attribute it to bounded rationality. 9 Optimal saving is un-
likely to be reached in the buffer stock model through trial and
error either; Allen and Carroll (2001) show that learning by simple
reinforcement is far too slow to produce convergence to optimal
saving in reasonable timescales. Consumers may not be able to
figure out or learn over time (with modest experience) how to save
optimally.
Because there was no widely accepted theory of how bounded
rationally should be modeled formally in these settings, 1° the
7. Several surveys have shown that a portion of Americans exhibit very little
"financial literacy"; that is, they are unable to calculate percentages, compound
interest, or divisions of funds (Lusardi and Mitchell 2007a), problems that are
far simpler than solving the buffer stock savings model optimally. Lusardi and
Mitchell (2007b) find that financial literacy is positively related to wealth available
at retirement in "baby boomers."
8. Another kind of bound on rationality is that consumers are overoptimistic
about future income or underestimate the force of habit formation. Note that
these possibilities are controlled out in experiments by inducing beliefs about the
income process and subjects' understanding of the degree of habit formation. So if
we find that subjects save optimally, but believe that Americans do not, then the
experiments suggest that misperceptions about income and habit formation could
be the culprit in generating suboptimal saving in the field data.
9. With the exception of Bernasconi and Kirchkamp (2000), previous experi-
mental work with simpler models finds evidence of undersaving and attributes it
to bounded rationality (Hey 1988; Hey and Dardanoni 1988; Fehr and Zych 1998;
Kotlikoff, Johnson, and Samuelson 2001; Ballinger, Palumbo, and Wilcox 2003;
Carbone and Hey 2004; Carbone 2005; Ballinger et al. 2006).
10. Ballinger et al. (2006) model bounded rationality as individuals only
looking ahead a fixed number of periods. They interpret the results of Ballinger,
Palumbo, and Wilcox (2003) to suggest most subjects only look ahead two
periods.
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LEARNING AND TEMPTATION IN SAVING EXPERIMENTS 201
presence of rationality bounds was inferred indirectly: if subjects
made mistakes in the first life cycle, but learned over time or from
the social examples 11 (our first study also included social learning,
similar to Ballinger, Palumbo, and Wilcox [2003]), then we would
infer that their initial mistakes resulted from bounds on rational-
ity, because subjects with unbounded rationality would not need
to learn from experience.
Development of a more precise theory of rationality bounds
and learning remains a priority for future research (and is dis-
cussed further in the conclusion).
II.B. Temptation and Dynamically Inconsistent Preferences
A second explanation for undersaving is that consumers know
how to save optimally, but cannot resist short-term temptations
to spend. For example, the availability of widespread credit can
contribute to overspending if, psychologically, credit cards anes-
thetize the "pain of paying" (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998). As
Carroll suggests,
There certainly seems to be strong evidence that American households are
now using credit cards in non-optimal ways. The optimal use of credit cards (at
least as implied by solving the final optimizing model discussed above) is as
an emergency reserve to be drawn on only rarely, in response to a particularly
bad shock or series of shocks. However, the median household with at least
one credit card holds about $7000 in debt on all cards combined. (2001, 42)
Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (2003) argue that this pattern
is explained by consumers who have a powerful preference for
immediate consumption, rather than bounded rationality in com-
puting optimal spending. This explanation has been supported by
empirical work on saving and neuroeconomic experiments. 12
11. Social learning can be considered a form of aggregating several lifetimes
of information. For other experiments of information aggregation, see research
on markets (Plott and Sunder 1982, 1988) and information cascades (in markets)
(Anderson and Holt 1997).
12. Both Angeletos et al. (2001) and Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (2007)
model undersaving using a quasi-hyperbolic (f3 — S) consumption model. They
found that a model in which agents have an immediate preference for consumption
(B < 1) was better calibrated to aggregate data than a model with only exponential
discounting. Shui and Ausubel (2004) find a similar result in a field experiment
using credit cards.
Neural evidence suggests that the brain may use two different processes to
evaluate the impulses for immediate consumption and saving, which fits the quasi-
hyperbolic model with an immediate preference for consumption (McClure et al.
2004, 2007). Neural evidence for a single hyperbolic valuation signal is offered by
Kable and Glimcher (2007).
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To test this explanation for undersaving, in the second exper-
imental study we converted consumption from numbers to actual
sips of beverage (for thirsty subjects). Comparing immediate and
delayed delivery of beverage consumption enabled us to study the
strength of temptation and dynamic inconsistency that might re-
sult. Of course, small amounts of beverage are not as dramatic
as temptations such as drug addiction, gambling, and credit card
spending, but they were feasible in the lab and gave us a first
contrast between money rewards and visceral temptations that
can guide future research.
III. STUDY 1: LEARNING WITH MONEY REWARDS
III.A. Experimental Design
Participants were carefully instructed about the basic con-
cepts of the experiment and how their decisions and the random
income draws would determine how much money they would earn
(see our working paper [Brown, Camerer, and Chua 2006, Ap-
pendix 11 for details and instructional tables). To avoid demand
effects and to enhance memorability, economic jargon like "income
shocks," "habit stock," and "utility," were translated into plainer
language—"adjustment factor," "lifestyle index," and "points," re-
spectively.
Subjects chose Ct
 in each period from cash on hand, which is
the sum of previous cash plus new income (Ye ). Income in each pe-
riod was Yt = Pr at , the product of Pt , permanent income that grew
at 5% [Pt = (1.05)Pt+1 , with initial Pl = 100] and a multiplicative
shock i7t , which was lognormally distributed [logil '-
There was no interest rate and discount factor, and no borrowing
or investment. Period-specific utility depended on consumption
and on an accumulated level of habit, according to
1-pe	 Ct+£
1–p' Ht_1
with risk-aversion parameter p = 3 and a habit strength expo-
nent y = 0.6. 13
 The habit stock grew according to Ht = AHt_1 + Ct ,
13. Because p = 3, the term k is the upper asymptote of utility, B is a scaling
parameter, and P bounds the utility function from below. In the experiments, E =
2.7, similar to Ballinger, Palumbo, and Wilcox (2003). Scaling factors are B = 750
and k = 40.
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LEARNING AND TEMPTATION IN SAVING EXPERIMENTS 203
where A = 0.7 is a depreciation rate (as in Fehr and Zych [19981)
and the initial habit Ho = 10. Thus, larger early consumption built
up the habit level and depreciated future-period utility. This "in-
ternality" implied that optimization requires restrained consump-
tion in early periods.
The subject's problem was to choose the stream of consump-
tion Cs in each period t to maximize his expected utility,
Ec	 u(Cs, Hs-1)
s-t
Because T = 30 in the experiments, the problem could be
simplified to a dynamic programming problem with two state vari-
ables, cash on hand Ct and habit Ht
 (after dividing both variables
by the permanent income Pt ).
The experimental environment was designed to have some ba-
sic empirical features of saving in the modern American economy.
The 5% income growth and lognormality of multiplicative shocks
are shown by Carroll (1992) to characterize U.S. data. However, we
chose T = 30 to compress the life cycles (compared to American
annualized lifetimes) in order to create "life cycles" that were long
enough to create a saving challenge and interesting dynamics, but
short enough to allow several life cycles in each experimental ses-
sion. We also multiplied the standard deviation of multiplicative
income shocks ra t
 by 5 (creating a standard deviation of 1, rather
than Carroll's estimate of 0.2) in order to deliberately produce
more income variation.
The goal of experiments like these was not to precisely recre-
ate all the empirical properties of naturally occurring decisions
in a particular setting. After all, parametric properties of saving
problems vary widely across periods of history and across coun-
tries so there is no single "real world" to serve as a unique design
target. The goal instead was to explore a range of environments
in which the theory might apply in order to judge when the theory
is likely to work and when it is likely to fail. We deliberately chose
income shock volatility that is larger than that observed in the
modern American economy because higher income variation cre-
ated a more analytically challenging environment in which devia-
tions from rationality would be more clearly observed. The design
also combined uncertain income and habit formation because (a)
previous experiments have already studied each separately and
(b) combining them made the problem much more challenging: if
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FIGURE I
Screenshot of Excel Interface
learning occurred, then the power of learning would be established
with more force.
The instructions explained all the details of the structure
described above. To make the details easier to understand, we
included thirty-draw samples from the lognormal distribution to
give participants a feel for how much their income could vary
and showed the utility functions and habit stock evolution using
numerical tables (see our working paper [Brown, Camerer, and
Chua 2006] ). One table illustrated how the habit stock in each
period was determined by the previous period's habit stock and
the current spending. A separate table showed how their spend-
ing and habit stock in one period determined their utility points
in that period. Before participating, subjects took a quiz testing
them on how their choices, habit levels, and income shocks would
determine utility points. The quiz was designed to satisfy con-
cerns that suboptimal consumption decisions do not arise from
confusion about how their decisions map into points (and even-
tual money earnings).
Consumption decisions were input to an Excel interface,
which displayed the income obtained, the corresponding cash
available, and the habit stock for each consumption choice (see
Figure I). The program also calculated and displayed the possible
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points (i.e., utilities) that could be obtained from different levels
of spending and the corresponding savings available for the
next period. Participants could experiment by inputting different
consumption amounts and see how much utility they would earn
and how much cash they would have available at the start of the
next period. Most participants tried out several spending choices
before making a decision (especially in the first couple of life
cycles). This process was repeated until the end of the life cycle of
thirty periods. (The program automatically spent all cash in the
final period 30.) There were a total of seven life cycles, to see how
rapidly subjects could learn across life cycles. Each participant's
total payoff was a preannounced linear function of the total points
earned in all life cycles 14 plus a $5 show-up payment. Subjects
earned between $7.50 and $65 with an average of $45.
After 36 subjects had participated in the private-learning con-
dition described above, 36 more participated in a social-learning
condition. In the social-learning condition, as part of their initial
instructions, subjects were given samples of three actual subjects'
period-by-period decisions for one lifetime in the private-learning
condition. 15 The three samples were taken from the highest-
earning subject, the lowest-earning subject, and from one subject
chosen at random from the private condition in their subject pool.
The social-learning subjects were told exactly how these three
samples were chosen.
There are many ways to implement social learning or imita-
tion (e.g., Ballinger, Palumbo, and Wilcox [2003] use direct talk-
ing). Our method mimicked intergenerational imitation in which
a parent points out three role models—a great success who re-
tires wealthy, a ne'er-do-well who ends up broke, and a random
acquaintance. The high-earning role model might have been a
subject who overspent early on (relative to the optimum) but
got lucky by receiving high-income draws. In that case, subjects
copied the "successful" subject too directly; they would have easily
overspent relative to the optimum, so it was not clear whether
social learning would have actually helped, hurt, or had no
effect.'6
14. The exchange rates were US$1.50 for every 100 experimental points in
Caltech, and US$2.50 in Singapore (using an exchange rate of US$1 - Sing$1.70).
15. The tables looked like the screens the participants had, showing income
each period, cash on hand, spending decisions, and points from each period of a
thirty-period life cycle.
16. Ex post we know that the highest scoring subject underconsumed for the
first ten periods, but then overconsumed for the remainder. The subject was lucky
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Participants were 35 undergraduates from the National Uni-
versity of Singapore (NUS) and 37 undergraduates from Califor-
nia Institute of Technology. These students were unusually adept
at analytical thinking, so they should represent an upper bound
on how well average consumers do in these intertemporal op-
timization problems. The participants were recruited using the
universities' mail servers. Half the participants (eighteen from
each school) did the experiment with private learning and ap-
proximately half (seventeen NUS, nineteen Caltech) did the ex-
periment with social learning. Each group had seven life cycles of
thirty periods of income draws. To simplify data analysis, within
each condition all participants received the same income draws
(but the draws were different in the two learning conditions). 17
Most participants completed the instruction and seven life cycles
in about ninety minutes.
III.B. Basic Results
Under optimality people should act as if they make ex ante
optimal saving decisions under uncertainty, discounting future
utilities exponentially, given their beliefs about future income
and other structural parameters. In our experimental design, sub-
jects should have saved a lot to build up a buffer stock, and then
spent roughly their average income once their buffer stock is large
enough. The buffer stock would protect against bad future income
draws, and high early saving would limit the negative "internal-
ity" of current spending on future utility (which occurs because
of the controlled effect of habit formation). Figure II illustrates
an optimal path of consumption, and cash on hand, given a par-
ticular life cycle of income shocks (based on parameters used in
the experiment, described later). Saving is the gap between the
black optimal consumption line and the gray cash-on-hand line.
In this example, the optimal consumer should spend less than
current income in early periods except 6-7 (when income hap-
pened to be unusually low and consumers should dip into their
savings to earn a reasonable utility from consumption). The opti-
mal cash on hand in the example steadily rises to 1,500 in period
to draw a high-income realization in the later periods so he could still produce
positive utility under a high level of lifestyle habit.
17. The income realizations were different so that the social-learning subjects
would never have a life cycle that matched exactly the income realizations seen by
the role model subjects (drawn from the private-learning condition).
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FIGURE 11
An Optimal Consumption Path
20, building up a buffer stock that is about six times the annual
income at that point. That is, consumers should brace themselves
for a rainy day by saving until about period 20. After period 20,
they should start to dissave by spending more than their cur-
rent income and dipping into their cash on hand (i.e., the optimal
consumption line is usually above the dotted income line after
period 20).
Table I gives summary statistics of actual point outcomes
in the two learning conditions. The first and second rows give
the average of total life cycle points in each condition and the
standard deviation across subjects. The third row is the difference
between the average point total and the (unconditional) optimal
point total. 18
 The fifth row is the total income in each life cycle
(which gives an idea of whether deviations from optimality in
a particular life cycle are due to bad decisions or to bad income
luck).
With only private learning, performance in the first three life
cycles was well below the unconditional optimum and highly vari-
able across subjects. However, by life cycle 4 the average subject
18. Note that in some cases, the average subject does better than the uncondi-
tional or conditional optimum (i.e., the deviation from optimality is positive). This
can happen if participants overspend (underspend) but get lucky (unlucky) and
have good (bad) income shocks in later periods.
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FIGURE III
Deviations from Conditional Optima, Life Cycle 1 and 7, Private Learning
earned point totals within 80% of the optimum and the variability
across subjects shrank.
Table I (bottom panel) shows that social learning brought
point outcomes close to the optimum rapidly. The mean and vari-
ation of points in the very first life cycle with social learning are
similar to those statistics from life cycles 4-7 with only private
learning. 19
III. C. Behavior Relative to Conditional Optimization
The Table I statistics compare point totals to unconditional
optimal level of spending in each period. This can be a misleading
comparison because conditional optimal spending in each period
depended on the participant's actual cash on hand and accumu-
lated habit stock. A subject who had made some bad decisions in
early periods, but then wised up and made conditionally optimal
decisions in later periods, would look bad in Table I but may have
been close to conditionally optimal overall when those few early
mistakes are averaged with the smarter later decisions.
Each subject's average conditional deviation for each period
is the difference between their actual spending and the optimum
(conditioned on that participant's earlier decisions). Figure III
plots the conditional deviation paths for life cycles 1 and 7 with
19. Note that in both conditions life cycle 5 featured the lowest total income
(the harshest income draws). In condition 1 it managed to cause the subjects and
the ex ante optimal path to have negative utility. In condition 2 it only reduced the
utility of the subjects.
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FIGURE IV
Deviations from Conditional Optima, Life Cycle 1 and 7, Social Learning
private learning, along with 95% confidence intervals (dotted
lines). Because the optimal conditional path in Figure III is the
zero-deviation horizontal line, the reader can judge at a glance
whether deviations are significant by seeing whether the confi-
dence interval covers the zero line or is far from it.
Figure III confirms the conclusion from Table I: with only pri-
vate learning, participants in life cycle 1 spent significantly more
than optimal in early periods, until about period 20 (when they
often spent too little). However, the life cycle 7 conditional devi-
ations are never significantly different from 0, which shows that
learning was very effective over the seven life cycles. In fact, the
actual spending path is insignificantly different from the condi-
tional optima by life cycle 4.
Figure IV shows the analogous data for the social-learning
condition. These small deviations are deliberately plotted with the
same y-axis scale as in Figure III, to show how much smaller the
deviations are when there is social learning compared to private
learning. Deviations are insignificantly different from 0 in most
periods. There is also little difference between life cycles 1 and
7 in the social-learning condition. The initial performance is so
close to optimal that there is little left to learn over the seven
lifestyles.
To measure the effects of private and social learning, we
regressed the log of the absolute deviation from the conditional
optimum on dummy variables for life cycles (excluding the first
life cycle), the period number and its square, and dummy variables
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TABLE II
REGRESSION OF LOG(ABSOLUTE DEVIATION FROM CONDITIONAL OPTIMUM)
Dependent variable: logged absolute
deviation from conditional optimum
Social learning —0.24*
(-2.51)
Life cycle 2 0.092*
(2.30)
Life cycle 3 —0.027
(-0.67)
Life cycle 4 0.075
(1.86)
Life cycle 5 —0.43
(-10.69)
Life cycle 6 —0.063
(-1.58)
Life cycle 7 —0.17**
(-4.21)
Period 0.084**
(15.91)
Period squared —0.00034*
(-2.01)
Female 0.19*
(1.99)
Chinese 0.0006
(0.01)
Constant 0.77**
(16.39)
RZ 0.20
Note. This table displays a regression of log(absolute deviation from conditional optimum), which is the
absolute difference in subject spending and each period's conditional optimum. Standard errors are given in
parenthesis. Independent variables include "social learning," which is 1 if the condition is social learning and
0 otherwise. Dummy variables for each life cycle (life cycle 1 is omitted so a constant may be included) and
period and period squared show the effects of learning over time and having fewer future periods to plan,
respectively. Dummy variables for demographics (Chinese =1, female=l) are also included. Asterisks indicate
statistical significance f *p < .05; ** p < .01).
for social-learning condition, gender (Female = 1, mean = 0.43)
and ethnicity (Chinese = 1, mean = 0.50).20
Table II shows the results. The period effect is positive (but
nonlinear because the squared-period effect is negative) because
20. See Chua and Camerer (2004) for details. Ethnicity is of interest because
Singaporean Chinese have one of the highest savings rates in the world (see
Carroll, Rhee, and Rhee [1999]). Participant random effects were also included to
control for individual differences, which are substantial. In a broader specification
a Caltech dummy variable was also included but is insignificant and was dropped.
The Chinese dummy variable is correlated with subject pool, but not strongly.
There are many ethnic Chinese students at Caltech, and Singaporean students
are not exclusively Chinese.
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the absolute deviations are larger in later periods, when incomes
are larger. The social-learning main effect is highly significant
(it implies a 24% reduction in conditional deviation), as are the
dummy variables for life cycles 5 and 7, reflecting learning across
life cycles. There is no significant effect of ethnicity and a small
effect of gender (women deviate about 20% more).
IV. STUDY 2: BEVERAGE REWARDS AND TEMPTATION
N.A. Experimental Design
Study 2 was the same as the first study except for one large
change. 21 Life cycles 1-2 and 4-5 (with money rewards) were the
same as in study 1. However, in life cycle 3 subjects received a fixed
monetary payment for their participation but did not earn any ad-
ditional money for decisions. Instead, in each period they drank
an amount of a beverage22 proportional to their consumption de-
cisions each period (1 mL beverage for each 2 points). The Excel
interface was modified to show the total milliliters of beverage
reward to be obtained, rather than points (utilities). It also dis-
played the maximum milliliters of beverage reward that could be
obtained from spending all available cash immediately. As noted
in the introduction, this change was designed to see whether sav-
ing decisions about abstract money reward were different from
those about viscerally tempting rewards, namely, liquid consump-
tion by thirsty subjects.
To make this reward appealing and limit satiation across the
experiment, subjects were asked not to drink for four hours before
the experiment began. 23 They also began by eating some salty
21. One reason to keep the complex design with habit formation and stochastic
income was because behavioral research suggests that higher cognitive loads make
people more likely to succumb to visceral temptation (Shiv and Fedorikhin 2002).
Additionally, subjects are more likely to succumb to temptation if they are unaware
they are doing so (Baumeister, Heatherton, and Tice 1994) or if the signals of doing
so are noisy (Bodner and Prelec 2003; Benabou and Tirole 2004).
22. Subjects were given their preference of Coke or Pepsi, and could sub-
stitute Diet Coke or Diet Pepsi if they requested it. We used these beverages
because they are widely valued, water was as motivating as colas, and because
pilot subjects (including the senior coauthor who was a pilot subject) thought
fruit juices that were tried were likely to induce satiation, which complicates the
analysis.
23. There is no way to know whether all subjects obeyed our request to show
up thirsty. However, because assignment to the immediate and delayed conditions
did not depend upon apparent thirst, uncontrolled and unmeasured differences in
preexperiment thirst are sources of sampling error in comparing the two groups
that lower the power of the test and bias the test against finding a difference
between the immediate and delayed conditions.
 at California Institute of Technology on February 17, 2011
qje.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
LEARNING AND TEMPTATION IN SAVING EXPERIMENTS 213
snacks. Because it took them 45 minutes to read the instructions
and to complete two 30-period life cycles for money before the
beverage life cycle, they were definitely thirsty by the time they
reached the beverage life cycle. It is likely that they did not satiate
during the life cycle because no subject received more than 350
mL of soda (less than a 12-oz. can) of cola in that life cycle, subjects
would only be able to drink a maximum of 20 mL/period (0.7 oz.),
and beverage periods were separated by one minute. 24 Subjects
were required to drink their entire beverage in that one-minute
period (and they always did).
A syringe pump was used to deliver an exact amount of bever-
age into a cup. 25 If subjects incurred a negative number of points in
any period, they incurred a debt of sorts—they would not receive
any beverage until that level had been offset by future positive
point totals. This debt was "forgiven" at the end of the bever-
age life cycle because we could not force subjects to "pay back"
the debt by taking away the beverage (as we do in the money
life cycles).
There were two different reward-delivery conditions in the
beverage life cycle. In the immediate condition, subjects received
their beverage reward right after making their decision. In the
delayed condition, subjects received their beverage reward (cho-
sen in period t) ten periods after making their decision (in pe-
riod t + 10). 26 Quasi-hyperbolic or present-bias models of time
discounting had predicted that subjects would drink more bev-
erage in the early periods of the immediate condition because
delayed rewards would be heavily discounted (see our working
paper [Brown, Camerer, and Chua 2006] for a more formal ex-
planation). In the delayed condition, immediate choices did not
lead to immediate consumption, so the present bias term in – 8
discounting would disappear. Intuitively, the delayed condition
would provide external self-control that helps – b discounters.
Subjects should have drunk more overall in the delayed condition
if they were quasi-hyperbolic discounters.
24. The concavity of utility and properties of the buffer stock savings model
ensure that no subject could earn more than 700 points in any beverage or mone-
tary life cycle.
25. See our working paper [Brown, Camerer, and Chua 20061 for a diagram
of the beverage delivery apparatus.
26. To standardize both conditions completely, there were forty periods of one
minute each in life cycle 3. In the immediate condition, subjects did nothing in the
last ten periods. In the delayed condition, subjects made decisions in the first ten
periods, but received no rewards. In the last ten periods of that condition, subjects
received their rewards from periods 21 to 30 but made no decisions.
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TABLE III
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF RESULTS IN IMMEDIATE AND DELAYED CONDITIONS IN THE
BEVERAGE LIFE CYCLE, STUDY 2
Immediate Delayed
Parametric
test
Nonparametric
test
Total beverage 176.78 215.65 t = 1.71 z = 2.09
received (81.31) (82.89) p = .047 p = .018
Total expected losses 171.91 96.98 t = 2.35 z = 2.34
from optimal (128.13) (104.04) p = .011 p = .010
(bounded at 350 mL)
Average expected loss 18.36 6.40 t = 1.92 z = 1.77
from overspending (28.78) (10.91) p = .031 p = .038
Note. Sample standard deviations are in parentheses below means. All p-values are one-tailed. The
nonparametric test used is the Mann-Whitney test.
Subjects were n = 52 Caltech students.27 Because a single
liquid-delivery apparatus was used, experiments were conducted
in a single office rather than a computer lab with one subject
at a time. As a result, this study was more laborious than most
economics experiments (taking about 130 hours of experimenter-
subject contact time).
N.B. Results
Total Beverage Awarded. The hyperbolic discounting and
dual-self models predicted that subjects in the immediate con-
dition would receive less beverage than in the delayed condition,
because they would consume relatively more compared to a total-
reward-maximizing optimum in early periods. 28 This prediction
is empirically correct (see Table III, row (1)). The immediate-
condition subjects drank less total beverage on average (179 mL,
27. The first 44 subjects were run from April 21 to July 27, 2005. After that,
11 more subjects were run from February 7 to 16, 2006, to enlarge the sample and
check robustness of the result. Two subjects refused to drink during the beverage
period and were dropped from the analysis. Another subject's data were lost by
mistake.
28. An alternative explanation is that the first taste of cola primed subjects to
consume more. Because immediate subjects first received cola after period 1 and
delayed subjects first received cola after period 11, this priming could be responsi-
ble for the difference in total rewards. Although thirst priming has been studied in
psychology through subliminal means (e.g., Strahan, Spencer, and Zanna [20021),
to our knowledge no psychological work has studied or found evidence of this spe-
cific type of priming. Further, the data find an average consumption increase (11.7
vs. 14.2 mL) between periods 1 and 2 for the immediate condition, but an average
consumption decrease (10.4 vs. 8.2 mL) for the delayed. The jump between periods
1 and 2 in the immediate condition is most likely explained by a very high income
draw in period 2 (3.56) that on average, sextupled cash on hand (76.6 vs. 429.1).
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SD = 84.6) than the delayed-condition subjects (226 mL, SD =
79.0). There was substantial variation across subjects, but this
difference is significant at conventional levels by one-tailed tests
(t-test p = .047, Mann-Whitney rank sum test p = .015).
Adjusting for Skill. Simply comparing total beverages in the
immediate and delayed conditions does not control for possi-
ble differences in skill or discounting between subjects in those
conditions, which could be evidenced by differential performance
in the four money life cycles. To control for these skill differences,
we estimate the regression
(1)	 Pit = a +blrl +b2r2 +b3r4 +b4r5 +b5I +eit,
where Pi t is the point total for subject i in life cycle t, rl is a
dummy variable for life cycle i, and I is a dummy variable for the
immediate condition. If immediate consumption triggered over-
consumption and poorer savings accumulation, b5 <0.
Notice that point totals can be negative for the beverage life
cycle, but the total milliliters of beverage consumed cannot be
negative. (Subjects could not have been forced to "pay back" liq-
uid once it was consumed.) This constraint is different than for
the money rounds because a monetary point debt accumulated
in one life cycle could be offset by other life cycles (and subjects
are aware of this difference in incentive structures). If a large
beverage deficit (>350 mL) occurred in an earlier period, subjects
would have known that no amount of spending could have erased
this deficit. As a result, when subjects had large negative point
totals, they could have become indifferent about future decisions
(their marginal incentive disappears) and produced high negative
points. These high deviations occurred disproportionately in the
immediate condition, which then greatly overstates b5 when the
dependent variable is points (see Table IV). 29 To reduce the effects
29. Because subjects know they will not be forced to pay back previously
consumed beverage, it is conceivable that they could exploit this design property
by deliberately overconsuming in early periods and then running up point debts
they do not have to pay. We do not estimate such a model because the period-
specific maximum of liquid consumption is twenty mL per period, so the marginal
beverage value of increased consumption falls sharply. As a result, subjects who
are trying to optimize total liquid would smooth consumption and would never
deliberately run up a debt. In terms of our estimation below, a deliberate strategy
of overconsuming because of anticipated "bankruptcy" would be misclassified as
a low value of the discounting parameter S. There is no a priori reason to think
this pattern will be more common in the immediate and delayed conditions if both
types of subjects have similar discounting patterns.
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TABLE IV
REGRESSION OF LIFE CYCLE NUMBER AND CONDITION ON THREE MEASURES
OF SUBJECT PERFORMANCE, STUDY 2
Points Beverage
Sign-preserved
log points
Immediate —28,137.36** —39.58* —4.21**
condition (1) (7, 284.97) (20.39) (1.43)
rl —171.61 —20.78 —2.30
(6,264.08) (16.77) (1.20)
r2 —458.17 —57.27** —3.73**
(6,264.08) (16.77) (1.20)
r4 105.10 44.28** 1.14
(6,264.08) (16.77) (1.20)
r5 —656.71 —26.28 —6.93**
(6,264.08) (16.77) (1.20)
Constant 282.30 215.82** 4.60**
(5,151.29) (15.14) (1.02)
R2 0.09 0.16 0.22
N 268 268 268
Note. Three measures of subject performance are points (the total utility obtained in each life cycle, which
is linearly converted to cash in life cycles 1, 2, 4, and 5), beverage (the milliliters of beverage that would be
obtained in each life cycle if utility were converted to beverage as in life cycle 3), and sign-preserved points
(the log of absolute points obtained, keeping negative point totals negative). I is a dummy variable for the
immediate condition, ri is a dummy variable for life cycle i (life cycle 3 is excluded because a constant is used).
Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate one-tailed statistical significance (*p < .05; ** p < .01).
of these outliers, two alternative regressions were run. In the sec-
ond specification, each life cycle money point total was calculated
as if it were a beverage life cycle (i.e., periods with negative utility
are ignored). In the third specification, extreme point totals were
reduced in magnitude by taking the logarithms of their absolute
values with their sign preserved (i.e., the dependent variable is
[I P^tI/Pltlln(I Pitt )).
Table IV shows the results of a random effects regression run
on each model. In all three specifications the sign of b5, the effect
of the immediate condition, is negative and significant at p < .05.
In fact, these results are stronger in significance than the para-
metric t-tests reported in Table III, which implies that accounting
for individual differences in skill by using the money-life-cycle re-
sults actually enhances the significance of the immediate-delayed
condition difference (by reducing variation from cross-subject dif-
ferences in skill or patience).
These analyses use the overall point totals in the life cycle. As
in study 1, it is also useful to examine conditional deviations in
each period given decisions in previous periods. For each period in
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the beverage life cycle we calculated the future expected points for
that subject resulting from her decision, compared to the future
expected points from a conditionally total-reward-maximizing op-
timal decision in that period. We then converted these amounts
to milliliters of beverage and totaled these values over all thirty
periods. Because no subject received more than 350 mL of bever-
age in the life cycle or less than 0 mL, we bounded all totals at
350 mL. Row (2) of Table III shows the results. The average total
expected beverage loss, in conditional deviation from optimality,
was much higher for the immediate condition than for the delayed
condition (about twice as high).
Exploring the Time Series of Overspending in Early Peri-
ods. Online Appendix I, Figure A. 1, shows the average ratios of
spending to conditionally optimal spending. The figure confirms
that even when conditioning on past decisions, the immediate-
condition subjects were spending more in the first five periods.
(After that period the higher number of subjects with beverage
deficits and large habits in the immediate condition pushed down
their overspending. 30 ) Another diagnostic statistic is the average
overspending in those periods in which subjects overspent com-
pared to the conditional optimum. The immediate-condition sub-
jects actually made somewhat fewer overspending decisions than
the delayed-condition subjects (41% vs. 51% of decisions), 31 but
when they had overspent, the immediate-condition subjects spent
much more than was optimal (Table III, row (3)), which created
greater expected losses.
V. ESTIMATING QUASI-HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING PARAMETERS
The results presented to this point have supported the basic
prediction of the hyperbolic discounting and dual self models, that
subjects in the immediate condition would consume less overall.
Because the hyperbolic model is clearly parameterized, we can
also estimate best-fitting values of the parameters 3 and $ from
saving decisions and compare those values to estimates from other
30. Immediate subjects have more beverage deficits (4 subjects vs. 1 in period
6; 15 vs. 8 by period 10) and higher average habit levels accumulated (218 vs.
185 in period 6) than the delayed condition. It is not the case that the immediate
subjects became satiated on soft drinks compared to the delayed group, because
the immediate subjects have only drunk about 57 mL (2 oz.) on average after five
periods.
31. Periods in which a subject encountered a deficit of 20 mL or greater were
omitted from this analysis.
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studies. The analysis is restricted to observations when subjects
did not encounter beverage deficits. When subjects encountered
a beverage deficit, their decision could only be made to receive
future rewards, and so fB, the immediate bias term, should not
apply even in the immediate-beverage condition.32
In the quasi-hyperbolic model, the weights placed on imme-
diate and future rewards are 1, ,BS, fl 8 2 , ... ,BSt .... If S is close to
1, the terms St are close in numerical value, so there will be many
combinations of (,e, 8) values that produce similar sequences of
weights and similar choices. It is therefore difficult to estimate
the two parameters separately. When (,B, 8) were maximized si-
multaneously, the analysis often yielded values toward 0 or above
1. We therefore use a two-stage procedure to calibrate S and p for
each subject.
Because behavior in the delayed condition gave no informa-
tion about the present bias ,B, in theory, the delayed-condition
data is used to estimate S. So we first search for best-fitting val-
ues of SD that explain delayed-condition subject choices as if they
were maximizing discounted expected utility of consumption with
a discount rate SD and P = 1. These estimates minimize the sum
of squared percentage deviations between the actual consump-
tion and the consumption predicted by the model. This estimation
gives a distribution of 8D estimates with a mean of 0.904 and
standard deviation, across subjects, of 0.230. This mean value
is reasonable but is significantly less than 1 at the 2% level by
a cross-subject t-test (see Table V). (Note that a discount factor
around 0.9 is more plausibly interpreted as a reduced-form ex-
pression of suboptimal choice rather than true time preference
for these short-horizon experiments.)
The next challenge is to estimate ,BI values in the immediate
condition, using reasonable values of 6. 33 The procedure we use
32. Subjects with beverage deficits that were large enough knew they would
not receive liquid again and therefore had no incentive to choose one spending de-
cision over another. Although some subjects never encountered a beverage deficit,
and others encountered them early, each subject was given a single parameter
value and the results were analyzed so that each subject's value counts as much
as any other.
33. Using the mean of the delayed-condition estimates SD and estimating
subject-specific ,BI works poorly because differences in S values for those subjects
from the mean SD leads to implausible variation in estimates of Pi. The problem
with using the delayed-condition mean SD
 for the immediate-condition subjects
is the following: suppose an immediate-condition subject's S is smaller than the
mean SD. Then the best-fitting sequence of weights 1, ,BS, 05 2 , ... ^St will overes-
timate /3 because the ,B parameter is forced to pick up the slack for the underes-
timated S. Similarly, if the immediate-condition 5 is below the mean SD, P will be
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TABLE V
Two-STAGE PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF S AND f3 (N = 26) FOR BEVERAGE LIFE CYCLE
ONLY, STUDY 2
Model	 Standard	 Sophisticated	 Naive
Mean S of delayed	 1	 0.904**
(std deviation)	 n/a	 (0.230)
Mean $ of immediate	 1	 0.619***	 0.721***
(std deviation)	 n/a	 (0.211)	 (0.134)
Average squared deviations 	 0.230	 0.189	 0.193
per period, before deficits,
immediate subjects only,
using mean Ii and S
Note. The value "average squared deviations ... " is calculated from the sum of the squared difference
between a subject's consumption (measured as a proportion ofpermanent income) and theoretical consumption
(for the mean /J and fil in each period, before a beverage deficit is encountered (if applicable). It is divided by
the number of periods before the beverage deficit to standardize the value over all subjects, and then averaged
over all subjects. It provides a fit of each line. Asterisks indicate one-tailed statistical significance testing the
null hypothesis that the given parameter is equal to one (* p < .05; **p < .02, ***p < .01).
first fixes ,3 = 1 for each immediate-condition subject and then es-
timates a best-fitting value of Si for each of those subjects. These
values are shown in online Appendix I, Table A.1; the mean 81
is 0.85 and the standard deviation is 0.24. Because we are fixing
,B = 1, but we believe the actual ,BI values might be below 1, we
need to adjust the Si values in some way that permits more pre-
cise estimation of P. We do this by projecting the subject-specific
values of BS I onto the value of the distribution of 8 D estimated from
the delayed-condition subjects, which has the same standardized
deviation. That is, a specific immediate-condition estimate Si is ad-
justed to an estimate 81, where (8r — 0.904)/0.23 = (8 — 0.85)/0.24.
This procedure permits individual differences in Si values, but
yokes their distribution to the distribution of SD values to permit
better identification of fi. Using these adjusted values of 81 for
each immediate-condition subject, we then estimate fiI for each
subject.
There is one further complication. In quasi-hyperbolic mod-
els, people can be either sophisticated or naive (e.g., O'Donoghue
and Rabin [1999]). Sophisticated subjects discount delayed pay-
offs steeply but understand that in the future they will dis-
count steeply too. Naive subjects discount steeply but believe,
underestimated. Indeed, when we tried this procedure, the estimate of fl tended
to bifurcate to the lower and upper bounds placed on ft.
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mistakenly, that their current discount factors applied to future
periods will also be applied to later decisions.
The difference between sophistication and naivete can be il-
lustrated in a three-period example. In the first period, both types
of subjects apply weights 1, P8, and ,BS 2 to the three periods. How-
ever, the sophisticated subject knows that the discount rates 1
and ,BS will actually be applied to periods 2 and 3 when period 2
decisions are made, and accounts for this weighting in forecasting
period 2 and 3 choices. The naive subject thinks the discount rates
,BS and p6 2 will be used in period 2 to weight period 2 and period
3 utilities; because the $ 5 term will divide out in optimization,
the naive subject therefore thinks the relative weights applied in
periods 2 and 3 will be 1 and S (i.e., the naive subject thinks he
will act like an exponential discounter in the future).
In simple choice experiments these two behavioral assump-
tions are difficult to distinguish empirically, but our thirty-period
experiment gives some empirical leverage for distinguishing
them. We therefore estimate $ values (using the adjustment pro-
cedure described above) assuming both sophisticated and naive
forecasting of future behavior (see our working paper (Brown,
Camerer, and Chua 2006) for details).
The results are summarized in Table V. The estimates of ,B
in both the sophisticated and naive models are clustered around
0.6-0.7. Online Appendix I, Table A.1, shows individual subject
results;34 all but one subject's estimate is below 1 for both specifi-
cations, so the hypothesis that there is no present bias ($ = 1) is
strongly rejected. 35 The estimates of are in the ballpark of es-
timates of Angeletos et al. (2001) ($ = 0.55), Fang and Silverman
(2004) ($ = 0.69), Shui and Ausubel (2004) (B 0.8), DellaVigna
and Paserman (2005) (,B = 0.9), Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen
(2006) ($ = 0.74 — 0.89), and Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman
(2007) (B = 0.7) (from macroeconomic calibration, welfare take-
up, credit card use, unemployment spells, experiments in Viet-
nam, and consumption data, respectively). The values are also
close to other experiments with a much different design that used
juice and water rewards (,B = 0.52; McClure et al. [2004]).
34. A possible correlate of individual values is subject values on the Barratt
Impulsivity Scale (BIS). After subjects had completed their experimental session,
they answered a survey measuring their total "impulsivity" on the BIS 11 (Patton,
Stanford, and Barratt 1995). However, these values show little correlation with
the individual naive ps, sophisticated 0s, and subject performance (correlations
smaller than 0.1 in absolute value).
35. The correlation of ,8 and S estimates across subjects is around 0.35 for both
specifications of 0, and so there is no serious identification problem.
 at California Institute of Technology on February 17, 2011
qje.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
LEARNING AND TEMPTATION IN SAVING EXPERIMENTS 221
Measured by the sum of squared deviations, the naive model
fits better in 16 of 26 subjects. Because this structure is not de-
liberately designed to distinguish the two specifications, this is
just a clue that both specifications should be taken seriously as
explanations of behavior in future work.
VI. APPLYING THE QUASI-HYPERBOLIC MODEL TO BOUNDED
RATIONALITY AND SOCIAL LEARNING
Study 1 and study 2 both feature decisions made by subjects
in the same experimental framework, so it is useful to have a
unified approach to compare the results parametrically. In the
preceding section, we estimated the results in study 2 using the
quasi-hyperbolic model because that model has been designed and
commonly used to calibrate the trade-offs between immediate
and delayed rewards over time, and used to model temptation.
Any reasonable unified model must accommodate the empirical
immediate-delayed difference and the — 8 model is one way to
do so. However, it has never been used to represent bounded ra-
tionality or the effects of private and social learning on decisions.
One approach to creating a unified model is to estimate $ — &
parameter values for the private- and social-learning effects. Be-
cause learning means, empirically, saving more at the beginning,
in the f — S framework learning is expressed as a change in these
preference parameters. 36 Although this is clearly a reduced-form
approximation, it is the approach we take below. We return to the
details after discussing why other approaches are not likely to fit
these data any better. Of course, future research should certainly
tackle the problem of developing a more sensible and unified ap-
proach and designing the best experiments to test it.
Two other ways to potentially model private and social learn-
ing involve limited planning horizons and rules of thumb.
VI.A. Limited Planning Horizons
Ballinger et al. (2006) find that their data are reasonably
explained by a model in which subjects tend to think ahead only
36. One major reason why the quasi-hyperbolic model has not been used to
model bounded rationality is that p and I are assumed to be static parameters.
Any change to bounded rationality (i.e., learning) implies that one or more of the
parameters must change, violating that assumption. Relaxing this assumption in
a theoretical model of temptation, Brown (2008) finds that a dynamic f term can
explain motivations behind preserving internal precedents and personal rules.
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three periods. A more general version of this approach is a model
in which people optimize but act as if only K periods remain
(Ballinger et al. estimate K = 3). Note that full optimality is
K> 30 (in these thirty-period experiments) and in beginning
period T — K, subjects fully optimize (conditionally). Empirically,
this model cannot explain all our data. The period at which
consumption becomes conditionally optimal can be used to
approximate K, because in period T — K, people will begin to
(conditionally) optimize. Figure III suggests that K is around
10 because their decisions are conditionally optimal beginning
around period 20. But a model with a horizon K = 10 predicts
that subjects will consume everything in the delayed condition of
study 2 (because consumption is delivered ten periods later in the
delayed condition). This appealing model cannot easily account
parametrically for both the oversaving in study 1 (which implies
K around 10) and the fact that there is a limit on consumption in
the ten-period-delayed condition of study 2. To be clear, our view
is that the truncated-horizon model is a very plausible one, but it
just does not do well in explaining the central empirical features
of both of our studies.
VI.B. Rules of Thumb
Another approach to model bounded rationality and observed
learning is that consumers use a rule of thumb that is adjusted
by experience (e.g., Cochrane [19891). Two plausible rules are con-
suming a constant fraction of current income or a constant fraction
of accumulated cash on hand. Neither model fits our experimental
data especially well.
The actual consumption-to-income ratio does not exhibit a
trend across periods, but fluctuates wildly across periods (see on-
line Appendix II for details). For example, in the first life cycle of
the private-learning condition, in half the periods the propensity
to consume out of current income is less than 1, but in six of thirty
periods it is above 2 (i.e., subjects spend all the current income
and also dip into savings, because current income is too low to
produce an adequate consumption utility). Subjects seem to have
some intuitive ability, even in the first life cycle, to adjust spend-
ing from current income to smooth consumption across periods,
and so a simple rule-of-thumb model is strongly rejected. 31
37. In another working paper (Chua and Camerer 2004) we regressed con-
sumption against conditionally optimal consumption and rule-of-thumb spending
of a constant percentage of current income. The latter term has essentially no
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The actual ratio of consumption to cash on hand also exhibits
little trend before learning takes place, but also fluctuates sub-
stantially (in six periods it is around 0.4, and in seven periods it is
around 0.7, in the first private-learning life cycle). Learning does
change this ratio so it looks like a quadratic polynomial across
periods after learning takes place.
The most promising approach to modeling bounded rational-
ity is a propensity-to-consume policy function, which is a low-order
polynomial in the state variables (including cash on hand and the
number of periods remaining), which adjusts with experience (e.g.,
Houser, Keane, and McCabe [2004]). Adjusting from experience is
not so straightforward, however, because each life cycle only pro-
vides one observation on performance of a particular cross-period
policy. It is not clear how to adjust a polynomial policy across
thirty periods from a single observation on the entire dynamic
policy's performance rapidly enough to match the human learn-
ing we observe (see the well-known "credit assignment" problem
in learning of dynamic policies, e.g., Holland [19851).
Furthermore, even if we had an ideal model of variation and
learning across rule-of-thumb policies that could explain the ob-
served learning in experiment 1, these models are not likely to
explain the immediate-delayed condition effect in study 2.
Therefore, we use the ,B — l approach as a benchmark unified
model because it is the most natural way to explain the immediate-
delayed difference. We treat estimated changes in those param-
eters as very reduced-form expressions of learning as expressed
through these parameters.
Because of the problem in separately identifying f and 6
in this design, ad hoc methods are used to first identify S, then
estimate f given the estimates of 6. We use the same technique
as in study 2.
First consider private learning. We assume that = 1 in life
cycle 7, estimate S values from those subjects in life cycle 7 (the
mean estimate is 1.00), then apply those estimates of S (using
the same standardization procedure as before) to estimate ,B in
life cycles 1 and 4. These numbers indicate the strength of learn-
ing, if learning is assumed to only change ,B and not affect 6.
These results are shown in Table VI. The estimates of first- and
statistical weight. Our interpretation is that while subjects are not exactly opti-
mizing (they clearly undersave in early periods with only private learning), the
variation across the thirty periods is much better picked up by variation in optimal
consumption than by a constant rule of thumb.
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TABLE VI
TWO-STAGE PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF $ BY LEARNING CONDITION (N = 36),
STUDY 1
Lifetime 1 Lifetime 4
Condition Naive Sophisticated Naive Sophisticated Lifetime 7
Private learning 0.415 0.273 0.778 0.585 1
(0.339) (0.352) (0.323) (0.450) n/a
Social learning 0.671 0.421 0.974 1.025 1
(0.230) (0.424) (0.192) (0.398) n/a
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. The value is fixed at 1 for lifetime 7. In that life cycle, the
mean value S = 1.00 (0.16) for private learning and mean d = 1.03 (0.07) for social learning. The relationship
$ < 1 indicates a tendency to overconsume relative to the reward maximizing optimum.
fourth-life-cycle ,B are 0.415 and 0.778 for the naive model and
0.273 and 0.585 for the sophisticated model. These numbers are a
crude indication of the size of the suboptimality in consumption;
they suggest that about half the gap between the first life cycle /3
and the value of 1 is closed by life cycle 4.
For social learning, we use the same procedure. First ,B = 1
is assumed in life cycle 7 and an estimate of S is derived from
the life-cycle-7 data (the mean estimate is 1.03), which are then
applied when estimating ,B in life cycles 1 and 4. The resulting
estimates are 0.671 and 0.974 for the naive model and 0.421 and
1.025 for the sophisticated model.
Together, all these figures give us a simple parametric index
of the strength of learning, when learning is parameterized by
a change in the immediacy preference ,B—more appropriately, a
reduced-form proxy for undersaving. Assuming ,B = 1 in the last
life cycle (to permit identification), social learning increases /3
estimates substantially in the first life cycle compared to private
learning (from 0.415 to 0.671 assuming naivete, or 0.273 to 0.421
assuming sophistication). The learning is apparently much more
rapid in social learning as well, because the estimates of ,B are
very close to 1 even in life cycle 4 but are still far from 1 in private
learning.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Dynamic choice models in which current choices influence fu-
ture constraints or utilities are computationally difficult. Saving
in the presence of income uncertainty and habit formation is an
example of choice models in this class, which are especially rele-
vant in the economy.
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Empirical evidence on saving suggests that people are not al-
ways saving optimally (though many studies are consistent with
some features of optimal saving). However, tests with field data
depend sensitively on assumptions about expectations, separabil-
ity of consumption, and other unobservables. Experiments control
for these assumptions. Simple experiments done by others gener-
ally show that experimental subjects save too little. Our goal in
this paper was to extend this research to a more complicated (and
lifelike) environment that combines income uncertainty and habit
formation.
The paper's two studies examine two explanations for under-
saving in dynamic optimization problems. The first is bounded
rationality and the second is an immediacy preference (i.e., even
if people knew the optimal saving rules, they could not execute
them). Both explanations are tested in two experimental studies
using a common design and pool of highly skilled subjects. The
– 8 model measures undersaving across both studies.
We find that subjects saved much too little at first, but learned
to save close to optimal amounts after three or four life cycles of
direct experience (private learning). Furthermore, subjects who
have received social learning—examples of successful, unsuccess-
ful, and average experimental performance—produced saving de-
cisions that are quite close to optimal even in their first life cycle.
Because consumers are limited to one life cycle of private learn-
ing (absent reincarnation with memory), it would be interesting to
know what types of social learning are more effective. Does social
learning work better when it comes from family and friends, from
total strangers, from financial planners, or from training and ed-
ucation? Our data suggest that one type of social learning works
well but invites consideration of other forms that can be tested in
future experiments and in field data.
The fact that subjects could learn to save optimally for money
rewards led us to explore whether they saved optimally when re-
wards are more immediate and visceral—when thirsty subjects'
rewards were immediate sips of a cola beverage. The subjects who
sipped the beverage immediately also overspent (i.e., overdrank),
compared to the group of subjects who made decisions in one pe-
riod but did not get to sip that period's beverage amount until
ten periods later. As a result of their overspending, subjects in
the immediate-reward condition earned fewer total rewards than
those in the delayed condition, and received less than the theoreti-
cal, total-reward-maximizing optimum. This unique feature of our
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second study provides a model for future studies of highly tempt-
ing decisions such as addiction, overeating, and perhaps spending
splurges.
The difference in the performance under the immediate and
delayed conditions is consistent with the predictions of both the
quasi-hyperbolic and dual self models, and is not consistent with
the standard exponential model. When parameters of the quasi-
hyperbolic model are calibrated from subject decisions in the im-
mediate condition, the mean best-fitting $ (the degree of present
bias) is 0.62 for the sophisticated case and 0.72 for the naive case.
These values are close to values observed in some other studies
using both calibrations to aggregate data and direct experimental
measurement. Parameter estimates using ,B as a representation
of inexperience are much lower than those observed in field data
and experiments, which allow immediacy preference. Although
this model was not intended to be applied to measure bounded
rationality in a reduced-form way, the lower ,Bs suggest that if
consumers were inexperienced and did not know how much to con-
sume, they would be much more impatient than has been inferred
by Angeletos et al. (2001) and Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman
(2007) from aggregate savings and investment.
There are many directions for future research. The experi-
mental paradigm could also be extended by adding more lifelike
features, such as stochastic mortality, retirement, and supply-
side advice that either tempts subjects more or gives them good
advice. The fact that subjects in the delayed condition are able
to resist temptation better (and drink more total beverage as a
result) corroborates the conclusion of models such as Bernheim
and Rangel's (2004), that creating a time wedge between "order-
ing" and consuming may be helpful to people. This observation
suggests an experimental way to measure demand for external
self-control. The immediate-condition subjects are making a mis-
take, but they can't help doing so. If they had access to external
commitment, sophisticated hyperbolics would seek external com-
mitment. Future experiments could allow subjects in beverage
studies the choice between whether they want to participate in
the immediate or delayed condition; sophisticated subjects should
opt for the imposed delay. Naive hyperbolics and exponential dis-
counters would be indifferent about both conditions. An alter-
native theory (Gul and Pesendorfer 2001) suggests that agents
might prefer the delayed condition if it reduces disutility from
temptation.
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The natural question about experiments of this type is how
well their results generalize to naturally occurring saving by dif-
ferent groups of people. The experiments inevitably reflect the
classic trade-off in generalizing from stylized lab experiments to
naturally occurring choice: Experiments have high "internal va-
lidity" because the maintained assumptions of a particular theory
(e.g., about utility functions and beliefs about the income process)
can be clearly implemented with experimental control. Experi-
mental comparison of different treatments can also shed some
light on competing explanations (that is, the potential advantage
of the immediate-delayed consumption comparison in our second
study). However, the generalizability of the experiments to most
actual saving decisions is debatable because experiments neces-
sarily take place over a very short horizon and the saving life
cycle is long. These experiments, much like a time-lapse photo-
graph, show a process in a short amount of time (a few hours)
that usually spans a much longer time interval (many years).
Therefore, while we discuss the results in terms of their relevance
to debates about life cycle saving, readers are entitled to think of
the data as more generalizable about much shorter-term dynamic
decisions such as consumption of addictive substances, or taking
up an exercise regimen or diet.
Nonetheless, consumers may be making some life cycle deci-
sions in a way that is similar to the experimental protocol. Finan-
cial planning software exists (e.g., www.financialfate.com), similar
to that used in this experiment, which allows consumers to plan
their saving over a short-term horizon. The software allows them
to experiment with different assumptions and see what results
occur. So people using such software might be making decisions
in short periods of time, which are similar in timescale to the ex-
perimental decisions, even though the software-guided decisions
have long-run consequences for many years.
Additionally, although economic agents cannot experience
more than one life cycle, they can learn from the saving successes
and mistakes of others. Retirement advisors may exist because in-
dividuals are unable to make retirement decisions in one life cycle,
but can make good decisions after observing multiple life cycles
(and those histories are bottled and sold by advisors) and with for-
mal tools to analyze and explain what to do. The market may have
solved the cognitive problem in saving models by producing a sup-
ply of helpful retirement advisors. Alternatively, retirement advi-
sors may offer products allowing a cross-subsidization between
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inexperienced and experienced consumers, causing the decisions
of the most inexperienced consumers to become more suboptimal
(an idea discussed by Campbell [2006]). These phenomena can
be studied in experiments too, by allowing markets for advice and
group-level decisions (e.g., household saving) to see whether these
institutions lead toward or away from optimal choice.
DIVISION OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES, CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY
SINGAPORE PUBLIC SERVICES COMMISSION
DIVISION OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES, CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY
REFERENCES
Ainslie, George, "Specious Reward—Behavioral Theory of Impulsiveness and Im-
pulse Control," Psychological Bulletin, 82 (1975), 463-496.
Allen, Todd W., and Christopher D. Carroll, "Individual Learning about Consump-
tion," Macroeconomic Dynamics, 5 (2001), 255-271.
Anderson, Lisa R., and Charles A. Holt, "Information Cascades in the Laboratory,"
American Economic Review, 87 (1997), 847-862.
Angeletos, George-Marios, David Laibson, Andrea Repetto, Jeremy Tobacman,
and Stephen Weinberg, "The Hyperbolic Consumption Model: Calibration,
Simulation, and Empirical Evaluation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15
(2001), 47-68.
Ballinger, T. Parker, Eric Hudson, Leonie Karkoviata, and Nathaniel T. Wilcox,
"Saving Performance and Cognitive Abilities," Working Paper, Stephen F.
Austin State University, 2006.
Ballinger, T. Parker, Michael G. Palumbo, and Nathaniel T. Wilcox, "Precautionary
Saving and Social Learning across Generations: An Experiment," Economic
Journal, 113 (2003), 920-947.
Baumeister, Roy F., Todd F. Heatherton, and Dianne M. Tice, Losing Control:
How and Why People Fail at Self-Regulation (San Diego, CA: Academic Press,
1994).
Becker, Gary S., and Kevin M. Murphy, "A Theory of Rational Addiction," Journal
of Political Economy, 96 (1988), 675-700.
Benabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole, "Willpower and Personal Rules," Journal of
Political Economy, 112 (2004), 848-886.
Benartzi, Shlomo, and Richard H. Thaler, "Heuristics and Biases in Retirement
Savings Behavior," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21 (2007), 81-104.
Bernasconi, Michele, and Oliver Kirchkamp, "Why Do Monetary Policies Matter?
An Experimental Study of Saving and Inflation in an Overlapping Generations
Model," Journal of Monetary Economics, 46 (2000), 315-343.
Bernheim, B. Douglas, and Antonio Rangel, "Addiction and Cue-Triggered Decision
Processes," American Economic Review, 94 (2004), 1558-1590.
Bodner, Ronit, and Drazen Prelec, "The Diagnostic Value of Actions in a Self-
Signaling Model," in The Psychology of Economic Decisions, I. Brocasand J. D.
Carillo, eds. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003).
Brown, Alexander L., "Investigating Psychology-Influenced Economic Models in
Lab, Field, and Theory," Ph.D. Dissertation, California Institute of Technology,
2008.
Brown, Alexander L., Colin F. Camerer, and Zhikang E. Chua, "Learning and
Visceral Temptation in Dynamic Savings Experiments," Working Paper,
California Institute of Technology, 2006.
Browning, Martin, and Annamaria Lusardi, "Household Saving: Micro Theories
and Micro Facts," Journal of Economic Literature, 34 (1996), 1797-1855.
 at California Institute of Technology on February 17, 2011
qje.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
LEARNING AND TEMPTATION IN SAVING EXPERIMENTS 229
Campbell, John Y., "Household Finance," Journal of Finance, 61 (2006), 1553-
1604.
Carbone, Enrica, "Demographics and Behaviour," Experimental Economics, 8
(2005), 217-232.
Carbone, Enrica, and John D. Hey, "The Effect of Unemployment on Consumption:
An Experimental Analysis," Economic Journal, 114 (2004), 660-683.
Carroll, Christopher D., "The Buffer-Stock Theory of Saving—Some Macroeco-
nomic Evidence," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1992 (1992), 61-135.
—, "Buffer-Stock Saving and the Life Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (1997), 1-55.
"A Theory of the Consumption Function, with and without Liquidity Con-
straints," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15 (2001), 23-45.
Carroll, Christopher D., Judy Overland, and David N. Weil, "Saving and Growth
with Habit Formation," American Economic Review, 90 (2000), 341-355.
Carroll, Christopher D., Changyong Rhee, and Byungkun K. Rhee, "Does Cul-
tural Origin Affect Saving Behavior? Evidence from Immigrants," Economic
Development and Cultural Change, 48 (1999), 33-50.
Choi, James J., David Laibson, and Brigitte C. Madrian, "$100 Bills on the Side-
walk: Suboptimal Saving in 401(k) Plans," Working Paper, Harvard Univer-
sity, 2005.
Choi, James J., David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Andrew Metrick, "Optimal
Defaults,"American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 93 (2003), 180-
185.
Chua, Zhikang, and Colin F. Camerer, "Experiments on Intertemporal Consump-
tion with Habit Formation and Social Learning," Working Paper, California
Institute of Technology, 2004.
Cochrane, John H., "The Sensitivity of Tests of the Intertemporal Allocation of
Consumption to Near-Rational Alternatives," American Economic Review, 79
(1989), 319-337.
Darlin, Damon, "A Contrarian View: Save Less and Still Save Enough for Retire-
ment," New York Times, 27 January 2007.
DellaVigna, Stefano, and M. Daniele Paserman, "Job Search and Impatience,"
Journal of Labor Economics, 23 (2005), 527-588.
Fang, Hanming, and Dan Silverman, "On the Compassion of Time-Limited Welfare
Programs," Journal of Public Economics, 88 (2004), 1445-1470.
Fehr, Ernst, and Peter. K. Zych, "Do Addicts Behave Rationally?" Scandinavian
Journal of Economics, 100 (1998), 643-662.
Friedman, Milton, and National Bureau of Economic Research, A Theory of the
Consumption Function (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957).
Fuchs-Schundeln, Nicola, and Matthias Schundeln, "Precautionary Savings and
Self-Selection: Evidence from the German Reunification `Experiment'," Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 120 (2005), 1085-1120.
Fudenberg, Drew, and David Levine, "A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control,"
American Economic Review, 95 (2006), 1449-1476.
Gale, William G., John Sabelhaus, and Robert E. Hall, "Perspectives on the House-
hold Saving Rate," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1999 (1999), 181-
224.
Gul, Faruk, and Wolfgang Pesendorfer, "Temptation and Self-Control," Economet-
ric , 69 (2001), 1403-1435.
Haveman, Robert, Karen Holden, Barbara Wolfe, and Shane Sherlund, "Do Newly
Retired Workers in the United States Have Sufficient Resources to Maintain
Well-Being?" Economic Inquiry, 44 (2006), 249-264.
Hey, John D., "A Pilot Experimental Investigation into Optimal Consumption un-
der Uncertainty," in Applied Behavioural Economics, Shlomo Maital, ed. (New
York, NY: New York University Press, 1988).
Hey, John D., and Valentino Dardanoni, "Optimal Consumption under Uncer-
tainty: An Experimental Investigation," Economic Journal, 98 (1988), 105-
116.
Holland, John H., "Properties of the Bucket Brigade Algorithm," in Proceed-
ings of the First International Conference on Genetic Algorithms and Their
Applications, John J. Grefenstette, ed. (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum,
1985).
 at California Institute of Technology on February 17, 2011
qje.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
230	 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Houser, Daniel, Michael Keane, and Kevin McCabe, "Behavior in a Dynamic Deci-
sion Problem: An Analysis of Experimental Evidence Using a Bayesian Type
Classification Algorithm," Econometrica, 72 (2004), 781-822.
Kahle, Joseph W., and Paul W. Glimcher, "The Neural Correlates of Subjective
Value during Intertemporal Choice," Nature Neuroscience, 10 (2007), 1625-
1633.
Kotlikoff, Laurence J., Stephen Johnson, and William Samuelson, "Can People
Compute? An Experimental Test of the Life-Cycle Consumption Model," in
Essays on Savings, Bequests, Altruism and Life-Cycle Planning, Laurence J.
Kotlikoff, ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).
Laibson, David, "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 112 (1997), 443-477.
Laibson, David, Andrea Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman, "A Debt Puzzle," in Knowl-
edge, Information, and Expectations in Modern Macroeconomics : In Honor of
Edmund S. Phelps, Edmund S. Phelps and Philippe Aghion, eds. (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).
—, "Estimating Discount Functions with Consumption Choices over the Life-
cycle," Working Paper, Harvard University, 2007.
Loewenstein, George, and Ted O'Donoghue, "Animal Spirits: Affective and Delib-
erative Influences on Economic Behavior," Working Paper, Carnegie Mellon
University, 2004.
Lusardi, Annamaria, and Olivia S. Mitchell, "Financial Literacy and Retirement
Preparedness: Evidence and Implications for Financial Education," Business
Economics, 42 (2007a), 35-44.
—, "Baby Boomer Retirement Security: The Roles of Planning, Financial Liter-
acy, and Housing Wealth," Journal of Monetary Economics, 54 (2007b), 205-
224.
Lusardi, Annamaria, Jonathan Skinner, and Steven Venti, "Savings Puzzles and
Savings Policies in the United States," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 17
(2001), 95-115.
McClure, Samuel M., Keith M. Ericson, David I. Laibson, George Loewenstein,
and Jonathan D. Cohen, "Time Discounting for Primary Rewards," Journal of
Neuroscience, 27 (2007), 5796-5804.
McClure, Samuel M., David I. Laibson, George Loewenstein, and Jonathan D.
Cohen, "Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate and Delayed Monetary
Rewards," Science, 306 (2004), 503-507.
O'Donoghue, Ted, and Matthew Rabin, "Doing It Now or Later," American Eco-
nomic Review, 89 (1999), 103-124.
Patton, Jim H., Matthew S. Stanford, and Ernest S. Barratt, "Factor Structure of
the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale," Journal of Clinical Psychology, 51 (1995),
768-774.
Plott, Charles R., and Shyam Sunder, "Efficiency of Experimental Security Mar-
kets with Insider Information: An Application of Rational-Expectations Mod-
els," Journal of Political Economy, 90 (1982), 663-698.
—, "Rational Expectations and the Aggregation of Diverse Information in Lab-
oratory Security Markets," Econometrica, 56 (1988), 1085-1118.
Prelec, Drazen, and George Loewenstein, "The Red and the Black: Mental Ac-
counting of Savings and Debt," Marketing Science, 17 (1998), 4-28.
Rick, Scott I., Cynthia E. Cryder, and George Loewenstein, "Tightwads and
Spendthrifts," Journal of Consumer Research, 34 (2008), 767-782.
Scholz, John Karl, and Ananth Seshadri, "Children and Household Wealth,"
Research Paper No. WP 158, Michigan Retirement Research Center, 2007.
Scholz, John Karl, Ananth Seshadri, and Surachai Khitatrakun, "Are Americans
Saving `Optimally' for Retirement?" Journal of Political Economy, 114 (2006),
607-643.
Shiv, Baba, and Alexander Fedorikhin, "Spontaneous Versus Controlled Influences
of Stimulus-Based Affect on Choice Behavior," Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, 87 (2002), 342-370.
Shui, Haiyan, and Lawrence M. Ausubel, "Time Inconsistency in the Credit Card
Market," 14th Annual Utah Winter Finance Conference, 2004. Available on-
line at http://ssrn.com/abstract=586622.
 at California Institute of Technology on February 17, 2011
qje.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
LEARNING AND TEMPTATION IN SAVING EXPERIMENTS 231
Skinner, Jonathan, "Are You Sure You're Saving Enough for Retirement?" Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 21 (2007), 59-80.
Strahan, Erin J., Steven J. Spencer, and Mark P. Zanna, "Subliminal Priming and
Persuasion: Striking While the Iron Is Hot," Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 38 (2002), 556-568.
Tanaka, Tamomi, Colin F. Camerer, and Quang Nguyen, "Poverty, Politics, and
Preferences: Experimental and Survey Data from Vietnam," Working Paper,
California Institute of Technology, 2006.
Venti, Steven, "Choice, Behavior and Retirement Saving," in Oxford Handbook of
Pensions and Retirement Income, G. Clark, A. Munnell, and M. Orzsag, eds.
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006).
Zeldes, Stephen P., "Optimal Consumption with Stochastic Income: Deviations
from Certainty Equivalence," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104 (1989),
275-298.
 at California Institute of Technology on February 17, 2011
qje.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
